🏡Welcome To @crypyt0g30rgy WriteUps

Owning half of a government assets through AWS

How we got there

So it was on one evening, i was looking at targets at intigriti that had wide scope, (and offered some compensation to hackers for the time invested).

I landed on a good government based bug bounty, that claimed to offer a bonus to hackers. Lets call the target xboy why it had a scope of *.xboy.me

I went a head to my Parrot Sec VM and ran findomain tool for gathering subdomains. I got 700+ subdomains, ran httprobe by tomnomnom. It narrowed down the alive subdomains to several hundreds. I ran a simple script that i created with the help of chatgpt that sorts urls based on response types i.e 2XX, 3XX, 4XX etc and saves the to a folder called codes with corresponding url in the corresponding file i.e 200 OK will be save to codes/2XX.txt

Find the tool on my github https://github.com/crypt0g30rgy/Urls-Sorter

I started visiting all the 302 urls in my browser, because more than 75% of the target redirected to an sso provider i.e visiting admin.xboy.me would redirect me to sso.xboy.me.

I observed that most of the domains were made using JavaScript Frameworks under Nodejs. As i showed earlier in my previous post (AuthBypass) if devs are not careful these frameworks can expose the web app to attacks like PHP EAR Vulnerability. So if a developer assumes that they are protected by the SSO and adds secrets to the Web app public config because no one will see the web app under SSo (Oh!! How Wrong they can be)

As i was visiting the domains i would do view-source:{domain} and record my config findings in a config.txt file. I found a lot of api keys for their internal apis but they all seemed to be secured, so i decided to get every possible config variable first till i had visited all domains.

In one domain lets call it control.xboy.me i visted redirected me as usual to the SSO, so i did view-source:https://control.xboy.me and i searched for api and what was returned was a goldmine (i had no idea then). It returned values like below;

--snip--
accessKeyId:"AKIAGasfjkJFJFJKFDW"
secretAccessKey:"64cpqZwBdDTKDgkjagskgasldgh+asjfjasgdfs"
region:"eu-west-1"
awss3bucket:"s3b-dumdumbucket"
--snip--

I put this in the config.txt and didn't think much about it, as i had previously found keys that were restricted so i thought this too would be. I continued all my recon on configs since no authentication could be tested as we couldn't register on the SSO. After i was done, i was tired and decide to sleep and return to check the configs the following morning.

The next day i woke up, grabbed a cup of coco and went on to my work desk, after my pc powered on, i openned the config.txt file and decide to check the aws keys first. I had enumerate-iam installed so all i needed was to run it against the keys. I did;

python3 enumerate-iam.py --access-key AKIA... --secret-key 64cq...

And oh my, the tool light-up like a christmass tree. almost every call returned status: worked!

I had access to almost half their aws cloud assets, including hundreds of s3 buckets, several ec2 instances etc, full of citizens data.

Reproduction Steps

  1. Visit https://control.xboy.me/ .
  2. As observed, you get redirected to
https://sso.xboy.me/as/authorization.oauth2?client_id=control
&response_type=token&scope=openid&redirect_uri=https://control.xboy.me/home
  1. We have to stop the redirect so we can explore the source.
  2. do view-source:https://control.xboy.me/ does the trick.
  3. Now time to read the main JS file https://control.xboy.me/main.js
  4. do ctrl + f and search aws, you get taken to this line
const i={production:!0,base_url:"https://control.xboy.me/home",redirect_url:"https://control.xboy.me/as/authorization.oauth2?client_id=cdsinternal&response_type=token&scope=openid&redirect_uri=https://control.xboy.me/home",logoutURL:"https://control.xboy.me/idp/startSLO.ping?id_token={_token}&TargetResource=https://control.xboy.me/",nodeEndPoint:"https://api-control.xboy.me/cds",reportAPI:"https://api-control.xboy.me/cds",getSeedListApi:"https://8w839mqud.execute-api.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/contact/contact/",accessKeyId:"AKIAGasfjkJFJFJKFDW",secretAccessKey:"64cpqZwBdDTKDgkjagskgasldgh+asjfjasgdfs",s3Bucket:"s3b-dumdumbucket",private_history_api:"http://control-gasfghashasc9070808.elb.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com:9003/dv/selectiontool/history",queryResultGraphQLTable:"allCdsSelectiontoolQueryResults",autoRefreshQuery:!1}}

Playing with the aws keys

  1. Now create an aws profile

aws --profile xboy configure

  1. Get user

aws --profile xboy sts get-caller-identity

{
    "UserId": "AIDA4HAH654QHJAFSJFA",
    "Account": "000000000",
    "Arn": "arn:aws:iam::841140266037:user/control-01"
}
  1. list s3

aws --profile xboy s3 ls

  1. list ec2

aws --profile xboy ec2 describe-instances

Attacker could

>-Read and control Your aws Resources

>-execute code in any ec2

>-launch aws resources

Report

After i found this bug i was super excited and shaking a little because i was in a goverment server viewing so much data.

I had access to internal communications that exposed sensitive information.

So i wrote up a detailed report fast and sent it to the program at intigriti. The report was triaged within 45 mins.

After waiting for five days it got accepted, no bonus/bounty for this or even a hi and thanks for securing us, i guess they we not so happy to get pawned.

As of today the domain is not responding and the keys were added 2FA.

On Jan 31, i got awarded a €€€ bonus. Turns out they found this blog, how, i still have no idea, i guess if the government wants to find something they will, hehe.

basic

Contacts

@github @twitter @LinkedIn @Intigriti @hackerone_old

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